Despite four years of war, the Black Sea grain trade has proven more resilient than many had feared. But beneath stable export flows, structural pressures are mounting in both Russia and Ukraine, casting doubt on whether this resilience can be sustained through the end of the decade.
Russia and Ukraine play a pivotal role in the global grain market, together accounting for roughly 30% of global wheat exports before the war and supplying significant volumes of corn and barley. Their importance is particularly pronounced for Middle Eastern and North African countries, many of which rely heavily on Black Sea grain to meet domestic food demand.
At the start of the war in 2022, there were widespread fears that disruptions to exports from both countries would trigger a prolonged global supply shock and food shortages. However, while trade flows were temporarily disrupted and prices spiked, global markets eventually adapted and large-scale supply shortages did not materialize, as exports from the Black Sea region proved more resilient than initially expected.
Still, four years since the beginning of the war, the long-term impact of the wartime reality is started to be seen.
Russia: reliability of official data put into question
By 2030, Russia plans to expand its grain handling capacity at seaports from around 80 million metric tons to 100 million metric tons per year, Agriculture Minister Oksana Lut recently said. This would allow the country to increase grain exports to 80 million metric tons annually. In 2025, Russia exported around 50 million metric tons of grain, including 41 million metric tons of wheat.
The government remains committed to its long-term agricultural development strategy, which projects grain production rising steadily to 170 million metric tons by 2030.
However, many farmers question whether these targets are realistic — or whether even current production figures accurately reflect reality. According to Arkady Zlochevsky, president of the Russian Grain Union, 2025 yields were among the lowest in recent history.
A key concern is the sector’s deteriorating technological base. In an effort to manage costs, farmers are cutting back on investments in machinery, fertilizers and crop protection products. Over time, this is eroding productivity and undermining growth potential.
Industry representatives have also repeatedly raised doubts about the reliability of official production data. Some farmers suspect that figures are overstated to present a more favorable picture to senior officials — a practice reminiscent of the late Soviet period.
For example, Zlochevsky noted that the government reported a barley harvest of 20 million tonnes last year, despite a lack of corresponding market signals.
“Where did this barley go?” he said. "Nobody knows. Domestic consumption declined, as did exports."
Indirect indicators also point to mounting strain. Russia’s agricultural machinery sector is in crisis, according to Anton Alikhanov, industry and trade minister. The domestic market for grain harvesters shrank by 40% in 2025 to just 3,000 units, pushing leading manufacturers toward financial distress.
“The tax system is structured in such a way that electricity and metal costs in Russia are about 30% higher than in other countries, including China and the West,” said Konstantin Babkin, co-owner of Rostselmash. "At the same time, lending rates are significantly higher. This undermines the competitiveness of our agriculture and industry.”
Farmers, in turn, say their worsening financial position leaves them unable to invest in new equipment. One of the main pressures is the floating export duty introduced in 2021. Initially designed to protect the domestic market during the pandemic, it has increasingly taken on a fiscal role.
According to the Russian Grain Union, the duty cost farmers around RUB 1 trillion ($15 billion) between 2021 and 2023.
Unless policy is adjusted and fiscal pressure eased, industry participants say production is unlikely to grow significantly. However, with the federal budget under strain from war-related spending, the government is also unlikely to abandon a key source of revenue.
Ukraine: alone in the dark
If Russia’s constraints are increasingly policy-driven, Ukraine’s are shaped by the direct physical toll of war.
The Ukrainian grain sector faces a wide range of challenges, including the gradual loss of territory in the east, a severe labor shortage caused by mobilization and migration, and persistent energy disruptions. In recent months, blackouts have at times lasted up to 14 hours per day.
In 2025, Ukraine harvested between 57.6 million and 60.8 million tonnes of grain, according to the Economy Ministry. While significantly below the 86 million tonnes recorded in 2021, the figure still reflects a degree of adaptation, with output rising by 6–7% compared to 2024.
However, labor shortages have now become the most pressing issue. By some estimates, the sector lacks 30–40% of its workforce.
“Workforce is a critical factor,”said Taras Vysotsky, deputy agriculture minister, in February. “Many have gone to defend the country, and there is a constant shortage of highly skilled workers. Some have emigrated or been displaced.”
The impact is already reshaping the industry. Roles that were once almost exclusively male, such as combine harvester operators, are increasingly being filled by women.
Still, 2026 could mark a turning point, when these constraints begin to more clearly affect output.
“The shortage of personnel threatens to slow sowing, which will inevitably affect both the quality and quantity of the harvest,” said Pavlo Koval, CEO of the Ukrainian Agrarian Confederation.
Unlike other challenges, he noted, labor shortages cannot easily be solved with additional funding.
Energy disruptions are also affecting the sector indirectly by constraining fertilizer production. According to Koval, major plants such as Rivneazot and Cherkasyazot are operating at just 30–40% capacity, with frequent shutdowns. As a result, Ukraine now produces less than 2 million tonnes of mineral fertilizers — around a quarter of pre-war levels.
Even so, there are some grounds for cautious optimism. Industry representatives expect sowing areas to remain broadly stable.
“We expect to sow 22–22.5 million hectares, provided there are no major changes on the front line,” Koval said.
So far, the Black Sea grain sector has defied early expectations of collapse. But its ability to absorb shocks should not be mistaken for long-term stability. Without meaningful policy adjustments in Russia and a stabilization of wartime conditions in Ukraine, the region’s role as a reliable anchor of global grain supply may gradually weaken through the end of the decade.
For global grain buyers, the implications extend beyond the Black Sea region. If Russia's production growth stalls and Ukraine's wartime constraints deepen, import-dependent regions may increasingly look to alternative suppliers, including the United States, Canada and Australia. Such shifts could reshape export competition and contribute to greater volatility in global grain markets.
